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Abstract
This paper presents an extension of a methodology that we have introduced recently to analyze Dynamic
Fault Trees (DFT). The failure time distributions of the components are obtained from measurements
leading to discrete failure time distributions. The gate outputs in a DFT are numerically analyzed from the
input failure time distributions. This paper presents one major extension in which maintenance operations
are considered such that some components are replaced by new ones to increase the availability of the
system.
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1 Introduction
Fault Tree (FT) analysis is a standard technique used in reliability modeling [15].
Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) are an extension of Fault Trees to model more complex
systems where the duration and the sequences of events are taken into account (see
for instance [2] or [16] for a presentation). Because of this representation of time and
sequence of events, DFTs are much more diﬃcult to analyze than static Fault Trees.
The standard numerical approach combines the static analysis based on cut sets for
static gates and a Markov chain approach to model dynamic gates. New techniques
have been proposed (Monte Carlo simulation [11], process algebra [3]) but there is
still a need for some eﬃcient methods of resolution for large and complex DFTs.
Indeed, the Markovian approach leads as usual to the state space explosion
which prevents the analysis of large systems while simulations of transient processes
need a large number of replications of the sample-path computation to obtain an
accurate estimator for the reliability (see [7] and references therein for a statement
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 327 (2016) 27–47
1571-0661/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2016.09.022
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
of the problem and [14] for a tool based on the same set of methods). Thus, new
resolution methods still have to be investigated.
We have proposed in [6] a numerical procedure to compute the distribution of the
time to failure of a DFT or some stochastic bounds of this distribution which relies
on the description of component failure processes by some discrete distributions, our
model is not Markovian and it is not state-based unlike most of the tools (see [12] for
a survey). Here we allow some rejuvenation process for the system components and
we extend the numerical methods to take into account this maintenance activity.
Fault Trees are composed of a set of leaves which model the system components
and some gates whose inputs are connected to the leaves or to the outputs of other
gates. The value of the leaves is a boolean which is True, if the component is down,
and False otherwise. The whole topology, when there is no replicated events, must
be a tree. The root of the tree is a boolean value which must be True when the
system has failed. The fault trees contain 3 types of gates: OR, AND and K/N (K
out of N, or voting) gates. All of them are logical gates which are not needed to be
presented here.
DFTs also contain four new gates: PAND (priority AND), FDEP (functional
dependency), SEQ (sequential failures) and SPARE gates:
• SPARE gate. It is used to represent the replacement of a primary component by
a spare with the same functionality. Spare components may fail even if they are
dormant but the failure time distribution of a dormant component is lower in some
sense than the failure time distribution of the component which is operational.
A spare component may be ”cold”, if it cannot fail while it is dormant, or ”hot”
if the dormant has the same failure time distribution as an operating one, or
”warm” otherwise. CSP, HSP and WSP gates are associated respectively with
the cold, hot, and warm spare behaviors.
• FDEP. The FDEP gate has one main input connected to a component or to
another gate and it has several links connected to components. When the main
input becomes True, all the components connected by the links become True,
irrespective of their current values. If a DFT contains a FDEP gate, its topology
is not a tree anymore.
• PAND and STRICT-PAND (SPAND). The output of these gates becomes True
when all of its inputs have failed in a preassigned order (from left to right in
graphical notation). When the sequence of failures is not respected, the output
of the gate is False. As discrete time models are considered, a distinction is made
between PAND and SPAND when inputs become True at the same time.
• SEQ. The output of the SEQ gate becomes True when all of its inputs have
failed in a preassigned order but it is not possible that the failure events occur in
another order.
The DFT is represented by a function F (the so-called structure function [8])
which returns True when the system is down and False when it is operational. It
is the value carried by the root of the DFT. The analysis of the DFT consists in
computing the value of the structure function from the initial time (i.e. 0) up to
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the mission time (denoted as MT in this paper).
As in [6], the component failure time is assumed to follow a discrete distribution.
We directly use the experimental distributions obtained from the measurements
as an input for the reliability of the system components without any ﬁtting to
theoretical models. It was shown in [6] how to compute the reliability of the system
with some numerical algorithms associated with the gates and a global bottom-up
numerical procedure. This work extends this approach to include the rejuvenation
of some components with an external maintenance process. Even if there are some
works in the literature on evaluation of DFT when the components can be repaired
(see for instance [10]), the rejuvenation was not included in the DFT representation.
Indeed there is no description of maintenance or repair in the normalized description
of a DFT (see [16]).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the algorithms to compute
numerically the failure time distribution of a DFT or a stochastic bound of this
distribution. Section 3 shows how the method can be adapted to consider rejuve-
nation of some components. In both sections some examples are given to illustrate
the methodology. Section 4 is devoted to two examples taken from the literature.
2 Numerical analysis for the distribution of time before
failure associated with a DFT
Unlike most of the models in the literature, our model is not state-based and we
do not assume exponentially of the transitions to build a Markov chain. Instead,
following [6] we model the distribution of the time to failure of the components with
discrete random variables taking values in R+. dX will denote the probability mass
function (PMF) of random variable X and HdX = {i : dX(i) > 0} will denote the
support of distribution dX .
The analysis is based on a decomposition into subtrees like many other tech-
niques [5,7,10]. We ﬁrst assume that the DFT does not contain neither replicated
events nor FDEP gates. Therefore, the topology of the DFT is a tree and we only
have to consider one tree. The main assumption is the independence of the failure
events for the components of the model. Due to the tree topology the input dis-
tributions of any gate are independent. The reliability of the system is computed
between time 0 and Mission Time (MT ). Let EoT ∈ R+ be a symbolic time instant
called End of Time. Clearly EoT > MT . EoT will be used to describe PAND gates.
2.1 Numerical analysis of gates in a DFT without replicated events nor FDEP
gates
The independence of the inputs allows us to compute the distribution of the failure
time for the output of a gate using the product of probabilities. Each gate g ∈ {OR,
AND, K/N, SEQ, CSP, HSP, PAND, SPAND} is associated with a function (say f)
whose deﬁnition is given in Table 1 (for WSP, see [6]). Let I be the arity of f . For
instance, the OR gate is associated with the ”min” function. Indeed, an OR gate
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is faulty when the ﬁrst fault occurs.
Table 1
Description of the fg function.
g fg(v1, . . . , vI) max output size
OR min{v1, . . . , vI}
∑I
i=1 ni
AND max{v1, . . . , vI}
∑I
i=1 ni
K/N min
{
vi |
∑I
j=1 1(vj≤vi) ≥ k
} ∑I
i=1 ni
HSP max{v1, . . . , vI}
∑I
i=1 ni
PAND 1(v1≤...≤vI)vI + 1¬(v1≤...≤vI)EoT nI + 1
SPAND 1(v1<...<vI)vI + 1¬(v1<...<vI)EoT nI + 1
SEQ min
{∑I
i=1 vi, EoT
} ∏I
i=1 ni
CSP min
{∑I
i=1 vi, EoT
} ∏I
i=1 ni
Algorithm 1 Computation of the output distribution of gate g.
Input: Input distributions (dVi)1≤i≤I with supports HdV1 ,..., HdVI with respective
sizes n1, . . . , nI .
Output: Output distribution d with support Hd.
1: Hd ← ∅;
2: for all v1 ∈ HdV1 do
3: . . .
4: for all vI ∈ HdVI do
5: v ← fg(v1, . . . , vI);
6: if v ∈ Hd then
7: Hd ← Hd ∪ {v}; d(v) ← 0;
8: end if
9: d(v) ← d(v) +∏Ii=1 dVi(vi);
10: end for
11: . . .
12: end for
13: return d
Algorithm 1 presents the general computation of the output distribution of a
gate g. It applies function fg on all possible combinations of values (vi)1≤i≤I from
the supports (HdVi )1≤i≤I of the respective input distributions (dVi)1≤i≤I , adds the
result v to the support of output distribution d and updates its probability d(v)
by adding the product of the probabilities (dVi(vi))1≤i≤I that correspond to values
(vi)1≤i≤I . Note that distribution d returned by Algorithm 1 has support Hd with
size at most the size indicated in the last column of Table 1.
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Algorithm 1 needs
∏I
i=1 ni evaluations of f and accesses to d. Algorithms with
a better complexity are available. The output distributions of gates OR, AND,
K/N, HSP, PAND and SPAND can be computed in
∑I
i=1 ni steps using a fusion
of sorted lists and the output distributions of gates SEQ and CSP are associated
with the convolution of discrete distributions which can be solved with a FFT based
algorithm with
∑I
i=1 ni × log(
∑I
i=1 ni) steps. The HSP is equivalent to an AND
gate, and the CSP gate is equivalent to a SEQ gate. The PAND and the STRICT
PAND gates have the same complexity as an AND gate.
Example 2.1 [OR and SEQ gates] Consider an OR gate with inputs da and db.
The output distribution of the OR gate is given as:
da 0.25 0.1 0.35 0.15 0.15
Hda 0 3 5 9 11
db 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Hdb 3 4 5 9 14 16
OR(da, db) 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.06
HOR(da,db) 0 3 4 5 9 11
Consider now a SEQ gate with the same inputs da and db. The output distri-
bution of the SEQ gate is given as:
SEQ(da, db) 0.05 0.05 0.025 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.095
0.035 0.04 0.03 0.105 0.03 0.09 0.01
0.015 0.065 0.015 0.105 0.015 0.06 0.045
HSEQ(da,db) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 23 25 27
This example gives a nice intuition of the size explosion problem. The size of
the output distribution may increase considerably at each gate.
Let us now evaluate a simple DFT with a tree topology. This algorithm can
also be used to evaluate a subtree. Note that various subtrees will be used in the
following to deal with PAND gates, replicated events or maintenance agents.
Algorithm 2 gives the analysis of a DFT without replicated events using a
bottom-up approach based on the labels given in step 1. Due to the topological
ordering, the distributions are always available when needed.
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Algorithm 2 Exact computation of the output distribution of a DFT without
replicated events.
Input: DFT T and mission time MT
Output: Output distribution
1: Label the gates using the topological order from the bottom to the top.
2: for all gate g in the tree, in the ascending order of the labels do
3: Evaluate the output distribution of gate g between 0 and MT according to
the gate type and its inputs with Algorithm 1.
4: end for
2.2 Numerical analysis with replicated events or FDEP gates
Note that a FDEP gate is equivalent to replicated events as shown in Figure 1. In a
ﬁrst step of the analysis, we replace the FDEP gates by replicated events. Note that
the trigger of the FDEP gate may be an event or a subtree, which can be evaluated
in a ﬁrst step.
gate1 gate2 gate1 gate2
A B C D E A B D E A C
FDEP gate
Fig. 1. Equivalence between a FDEP gate and multiple OR gates with duplicated leaves.
When some events are replicated, we cannot assume independence anymore
among the input distributions of a gate. Thus, we have to condition on the fail-
ure times of the replicated events and use the total probability theorem to get the
availability. We call the set of replicated leaves the conditioning set. Let nR be
the number of time instants in the joint distribution of the replicated events. The
probability that the system is operational at time t conditioned on the failure in-
stants of the replicated components is computed with Algorithm 1. However, we
have to compute nR such conditional probabilities before computing the reliability.
To avoid unnecessary computation, we only consider conditional probabilities when
needed. Clearly, it is suﬃcient to consider a subtree containing all the replicated
leaves. Better strategies exist (see [6]).
2.3 Stochastic comparison and stochastic monotonicity: dealing with complexity
issues
Assume that the inputs of a gate have distributions d1 and d2 with sizes n1 and
n2. The size of the distribution of the failure time for the output of this gate can
be as large as n1 × n2. We use the stochastic monotonicity theory to reduce the
size of the distributions while proving that they provide upper or lower stochastic
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Algorithm 3 Exact computation of the output distribution of a DFT with repli-
cated events.
Input: DFT T , and mission time MT
Output: Output distribution
1: Evaluate the subtrees rooted at the triggers of the FDEP gates with Algorithm
2 (not needed if the trigger is an event).
2: Convert the FDEP gate into replicated events
3: Build the smallest subtree containing all the replicated leaves.
4: for all the time instant u when the replicated leaves may fail do
5: Use Algorithm 2 to compute the distribution between 0 and MT conditioned
on the failure of the replicated leaves at time u.
6: end for
7: Use the total probability theorem to analyze the subtree between 0 and MT .
8: Use Algorithm 2 to analyze the remaining tree and compute the probability
that the system is operational at time t between 0 and MT .
bounds on the reliability of the system. Formally, for a given distribution d with
support Hd of size M ∈ N (|Hd| = M), two bounding distributions are built: dl
with support Hdl of size n ∈ N such that n < M (|Hdl | = n) and du with support
Hdu of size n (|Hdu | = n). Note that Hdl and Hdu have the same size but they are
not necessarily the same set. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the stochastic comparison and the
stochastic monotonicity (refer to Stoyan’s book [9] for theoretical issues).
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let X and Y be two discrete random variables with dX and dY as
PMFs.
X ≤st Y ⇔ ∀i ∈ HdX ∪HdY ,
∑
k≥i
dX(k) ≤
∑
k≥i
dY (k)
Note that the notations X ≤st Y and dX ≤st dY are interchangeably used in this
paper.
Example 2.3 Consider discrete random variables X and Y with:
dX 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.25
HdX 1 2.1 3 4.8 5 6 10
dY 0.25 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.3
HdY 2.1 3 4.8 5 6 10
It can be checked that dX ≤st dY . Intuitively, the probability mass of dY
is concentrated on higher states than that of dX . In other words the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of X is always larger than the CDF of Y (see Figure 2).
Let us now turn to the stochastic monotonicity property applied to the DFT
gates. Intuitively, if such a property holds, then when the inputs increase in the
strong stochastic sense (i.e. ≤st ordering), so does the outputs (see reference [6] for
proofs).
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the CDF of Example 2.3 (X in red and Y in blue).
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let g be a DFT gate with I independent inputs (Vi)1≤i≤I and
output Q. Gate g is said to be stochastically monotone, if the inputs (Vi)1≤i≤I are
upper-bounded by independent bounds (V ui )1≤i≤I , then the output Q
u with inputs
(V ui )1≤i≤I provides the upper bound of the output Q with inputs (Vi)1≤i≤I :
(∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ I : Vi ≤st V ui ) =⇒ Q ≤st Qu.
Theorem 2.5 (see Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in [6]) All the gates are stochastically
monotone except for the PAND and the SPAND gates.
Therefore, if during the evaluation of a gate, its input distributions are replaced
by their stochastic bounds, a stochastic bound of the output distribution can be
obtained. This property is extremely important to avoid that the sizes of the dis-
tributions become too large during the analysis. Let us consider an example to
illustrate the problem.
It remains to explain how one can compute stochastic bounds of a discrete
distribution. It is a rather intuitive task. A discrete distribution is a step function.
A stochastic upper (resp. lower) bound with a smallest support is another step
function with less steps and which is below (resp. above) the original one. Some
algorithms have been presented in [1] and [6]. They diﬀer by their complexity and
the accuracy of the bounds. One of them is optimal according to the diﬀerence of
rewards between the distributions and the others are faster. All of them provide
stochastic bounds of the distribution. The modelers can use any of these algorithms
with the ability to choose between the speed or the accuracy of the computation.
Example 2.6 [Monotonicity of the SEQ gate.] The output of SEQ(da, db) has been
given in Example 2.1. Consider the upper bound dua of da given in the following
table. The output distribution of SEQ(dua, db) is:
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dua 0.25 0.45 0.3
Hdua 0 5 11
SEQ(dua, db) 0.05 0.05 0.025 0.09 0.115 0.045 0.13
0.06 0.105 0.045 0.03 0.135 0.03 0.09
HSEQ(dua ,db) 3 4 5 8 9 10 14
15 16 19 20 21 25 27
Figure 3 shows the cumulative probability distributions for SEQ(da, db) and
SEQ(dua, db). Clearly, SEQ(da, db) ≤st SEQ(dua, db).
t
probability
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
CDF of SEQ(dua , db)
CDF of SEQ(da, db)
Fig. 3. Monotonicity of the SEQ gate. The exact distribution is in red while the upper bound is in blue.
As most of the gates (except the PAND and SPAND gates) are stochastically
monotone, it can be proved that Algorithm 4 provides stochastic bounds for the
reliability of a system modeled by a DFT [6]. The size of the bounding distributions
is limited to n. Algorithm 4 prevents the bounding of any internal distribution in
the subtree rooted with a PAND or SPAND gate which must be evaluated ﬁrst.
3 Analysis of a DFT with some maintenance processes
We ﬁrst describe the model for the rejuvenation of the components. Then, we
present the numerical algorithm to compute the availability at time t when t varies
from 0 to the mission time. Finally, we prove that like our original approach in
[6] one can derive stochastic bounds of the availability. Remember that due to the
maintenance process, we now consider the availability at time t rather than the
reliability at time t.
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Algorithm 4 Bounded computation of the output distribution of a DFT without
replicated events.
Input: DFT T , n ∈ N and mission time MT
Output: Output distribution
1: Build all the subtrees rooted in the PAND gates.
2: for all the subtrees rooted in a PAND gate do
3: Use Algorithm 2 to compute the distribution at the output of the subtree
between 0 and MT
4: If the size of the output distribution is larger than n, use one of the compres-
sion methods [1,6] to reduce its size to n and replace the subtree by a leaf
with this distribution.
5: end for
6: Label the remaining gates using the topological order from the bottom to the
top.
7: for all remaining gates g in the ascending order of the labels do
8: Evaluate the output distribution of gate g with Algorithm 1
9: If the size of the output distribution is larger than n, reduce its size to n.
10: end for
3.1 Agents and Model of rejuvenation
We assume that there exist R maintenance agents. They play the same role as the
repair blocks in [10] but they are modeled by a set of time instants and a set of
leaves rather than a Petri net. Each agent r, 1 ≤ r ≤ R is described by two sets:
Tr, the set of maintenance instants of Agent r, and Lr, the set of the components
(leaves) which are maintained by Agent r. Note that ∀t ∈ Tr : t ≤ MT . Agent r
acts as follows:
• At each instant t ∈ Tr, Agent r replaces each component which belongs to Lr by
a new one. The agents do not take into account if the component is faulty or not
before replacing it. We assume that the rejuvenation is instantaneous. As the
component is replaced by a new one, the failure time distribution is reset at the
maintenance instants.
• Several agents may work at the same time instant: for any agents r and s, it is
not required that Tr ∩ Ts = ∅.
• Some components may never be replaced and some components may be replaced
by several agents. Thus it is not required that the subsets (Lr)1≤r≤R have to be
a partition of the set of leaves.
• Finally, a fault may occur at the same time instant as a maintenance process.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the failures take place before the
maintenance.
Note that coordinated maintenance policies such as the ones described in [10]
can be described by a sequence of agents acting at closed time instants.
We build the set of maintenance time instants: T = ∪Rr=1Tr ∪ {MT, 0} and we
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index it such that:
T = {0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < . . . < tp−1 < tp = MT}.
Si will be the set of components replaced at time ti: Si is the union of subsets Lj for
all j such that ti ∈ Tj , or more formally: Si = ∪ti∈TjLj (as there is no intervention
at instant t0 = 0, S0 = ∅).
The gates that may be replaced by an agent will be classiﬁed as static or dynamic
as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 In this paper, gates {OR, AND, K/N, HSP} are denoted as static
while gates {SEQ, WSP, CSP, PAND, SPAND} are deﬁned as dynamic. The FDEP
gates are transformed into replication of events as seen previously. Thus, they are
not considered in the classiﬁcation.
We now consider the paths from an arbitrary component (say leaf u) to the root
of the DFT. As the leaf may be replicated or may trigger a FDEP gate, more than
one path may exist. Thus, in general, we have to consider several paths. Let Pu be
the set of paths P (u) from leaf u to the root of the DFT. A path P (u) is an ordered
sequence of gates ending at the root of the DFT. Let Gu be the set of dynamic gates
in Pu.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A leaf u is said to be static if along all the paths in Pu, all the
gates are static (i.e. Gu is empty). A leaf u is said to be dynamic if there exists at
least one path P (u) which contains at least one dynamic gate.
Adding maintenance agents to a DFT may lead to semantics problems which, to
the best of our knowledge, have not been solved in the literature. Thus, we consider
in this paper a set of policies which satisfy some consistency constraints.
First, let us deﬁne a relation among the leaves of the DFT (or the components
of the system). Let G = (V,E) be a graph such that V is the set of leaves of the
DFT and e = (f, h) is an edge of G if Gf ∩ Gh = ∅.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A maintenance agent (say j) is said to be dynamic-compliant if the
following conditions holds:
• if a dynamic leaf (say i) is in Lj , then all the leaves in the connected component
of i in G are also in Lj ,
• there is no constraint on the static leaves of Lj .
Remark 3.4 If the DFT has no replicated leaves, the connected component of
G are associated with subtrees rooted in some dynamic gates. We say that these
dynamic gates and these subtrees are associated with the maintenance agents.
In the following we consider dynamic-compliant agents for maintenance. Intu-
itively, it means that all the leaves connected to a dynamic gate are either replaced
by the agent or ignored. This is the key idea to establish the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.5 Let g be a dynamic gate. After a maintenance by a dynamic-compliant
agent at time ti, the distribution of the output of gate g remains the same (if the
leaves in the subtree rooted in g are not replaced) or is shifted by ti (if the leaves
are replaced).
Proof. Consider the leaves in the subtree rooted in g. As g is dynamic and the
agent is dynamic-compliant, the leaves of the subtree are all replaced or none of
them are replaced. In the ﬁrst case, as all the components of the subtree are new
at time ti, the initial distribution of the time to failure for g is now shifted by ti. In
the other case, the distribution of the time to failure for g remains the same. 
Remark 3.6 Our methodology allows us to analyze static Fault Trees without any
constraints.
3.2 Computing the availability for a system with rejuvenation
For the sake of readability, we ﬁrst assume that there is no replicated events in the
DFT. Due to these assumptions, the structure of the DFT is a tree. The replication
is studied in the next section.
The algorithm proceeds by a loop on time intervals [ti, ti+1) where ti ∈ T . At
time ti, components in Si are replaced by new ones, and their distributions of time
to failure have to be shifted by ti to reﬂect the rejuvenation. For static leaves it is
suﬃcient to use Algorithm 2 with updated parameters. But dynamic leaves which
are replaced require a distinct method. We analyze the dynamic leaves taking into
account the assumptions on the agents and on the decomposition of the DFT into
subtrees. As usual once a subtree has been evaluated, it is replaced by a virtual leaf
with the associated distribution. In a ﬁrst step, we evaluate the subtrees associated
with the agents. After each replacement, the initial distribution of failures for this
subtree is translated by the current time to obtain the new distribution. As all
dynamic leaves which are replaced between 0 and MT are analyzed during the
subtree evaluation, the remaining DFT only contains static leaves and dynamic
leaves which are never replaced by the agents.
Let dc be the initial time to failure distribution for leaf c (component c). We
compute at each time interval [ti, ti+1), a distribution e
i
c which results from the
history of the component between 0 and ti. Concerning the leaves of the remaining
DFT, we clearly have three cases:
• They are static and they have been replaced at time ti. Their distribution is
shifted by ti. Let ⊗ denote the convolution of distributions:
eic = dc ⊗ ti.
• They have not been replaced at time ti and they are static, theoretically we do not
have to change their distributions. However in order to speed up the computation
time, we modify distribution ei−1c to minimize the size of the support while being
sure that the computations on the interval [ti, ti+1) are still exact. In fact for
static gates, at a given instant, one needs to know if inputs are faulty or not and
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the temporal order of failures is not important. Thus it is possible to keep as
information only the probability that a fault has been occurred before ti. More
formally, operator φ is applied on distribution ei−1c at time ti as follows: Let
α(ti) be the biggest time instant in the support of e
i−1
c such that α(ti) < ti.
The part of the distribution before ti is aggregated on instant α(ti): the support
of the distribution now begins at α(ti) and the probability at time α(ti) is the
summation of the probability in ei−1c before ti. Clearly such a modiﬁcation of
the distribution decreases the size of its support. Therefore it leads to a faster
computation when Algorithm 2 is called. The distributions computed between 0
and ti may be false before α(ti) but at time ti the failures have occurred with
the correct probabilities and the computations for time interval [ti, ti+1) correctly
take into account the aging process for the non replaced components.
eic = φ(e
i−1
c , α(ti)).
• They are dynamic and they will never been replaced, we do not change the
distribution:
eic = e
i−1
c .
Example 3.7 Consider the following input distribution d. Let us compute φ(d, 7).
Clearly, α(7) is 6, so:
d 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.24
Hd 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 14 15 16
φ(d, 7) 0.43 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.24
Hφ(d,7) 6 8 9 14 15 16
The main problem of the evaluation of the DFT is that, due to the dynamic
gates, one cannot evaluate the distribution in time interval [ti, ti+1) because one
must take into account the events before ti (remember for instance the semantics of
a PAND gate). Therefore, one must build the distribution from time 0 while only
time interval [ti, ti+1) is required to be computed. Let us now present the algorithm.
Theorem 3.8 Algorithm 5 computes the point availability of a DFT with mainte-
nance by dynamic compliant agents.
Proof. At each step, Algorithm 2 is used to get the distribution between 0 and
ti to obtain the result for time interval [ti−1, ti). Indeed, one must compute the
distribution between 0 and ti to take into account the aging of the components
which have not been replaced and whose behavior in [ti−1, ti) depends on the past.
For all cases, the output distribution of failure time in [0, ti−1) is irrelevant but it
is needed to insure the correctness of the result for time interval [ti−1, ti).
We still have to prove that as the maintenance agents are dynamic-compliant, the
evaluation of the availability in time interval [ti−1, ti) is correct. Basically, Lemma
3.5 explains how to compute the distribution for the subtree rooted in a dynamic
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Algorithm 5 Exact computation of the point availability of a DFT without repli-
cated events and with maintenance agents.
Input: DFT T , a set of time instants T and a list of sets (Si)0≤i<p
Output: Point availability a
1: for all subtrees rooted in the dynamic gates (say g) associated with all the
maintenance agents do
2: Compute dg the distribution of the time to failure for gate g using Algorithm
2 with MT as mission time and dc as input distributions for the leaves in the
subtree
3: end for
4: Copy all the distributions dc to ec.
5: Use Algorithm 2 with t1 as mission time and ec as input distributions to build
the failure time distribution for interval [0, t1).
6: for i ← 1 to p− 1 do
7: for all subtrees rooted in the dynamic gates (say g) associated with the
maintenance agents operating at time ti do
8: shift dg by ti to represent the rejuvenation of the subtree: eg = ti ⊗ dg.
9: end for
10: for all component c ∈ Si in the remaining DFT once the subtrees have been
evaluated do
11: if c is static then
12: Replace ec by ti ⊗ dc.
13: end if
14: end for
15: for all c ∈ Si do
16: if c is static then
17: Replace ec by φ(ec, α(ti)).
18: end if
19: end for
20: Use Algorithm 2 with ti+1 as mission time and input distributions ec (for
leaves) or eg (for subtrees rooted in the dynamic gates associated with the
maintenance agents).
21: Extract from the distribution the part between ti and ti+1, and use it the
compute the point availability a for the same time interval.
22: end for
gate associated with the agents. The output distributions for these subtrees are
computed with Algorithm 2. The subtrees are replaced by virtual leaves associated
with these distributions.
Then, we have to deal with the remaining tree which by construction only con-
tains static leaves and dynamic leaves which are never replaced between 0 and MT .
Basically, we now consider a virtual system with distributions eic for component c.
If a component (say c) is replaced, its distribution becomes dc shifted by ti−1. Oth-
erwise the distribution does not have to change (we show at the end of this proof
that Instruction 17 does not change the result).
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If a replaced component is static, its distribution is only used for the evaluation
of static gates. We compute the distribution for the tree associated with these
gates by Algorithm 2 between time 0 and ti using the shifted distributions for the
replaced components and the previously modiﬁed (or original) distributions for the
components which are not replaced. Finally, remark that:
• Instruction 18 only modiﬁes the distributions for static gates on time interval
[0, ti−1) while giving a correct probability of being operational at time ti−1. As
the gates are static, this will insure that the distributions in [ti−1, ti) are correctly
deﬁned.
• In Instruction 2, MT is an upper bound of the time duration. It is possible to
improve this bound.

3.3 Replication of events
The replication of events does not require any new techniques, even if the model
may be more complex to describe. The classiﬁcation of leaves as static or dynamic
is done after we have replaced the FDEP gates with replication of events. We have
to consider two cases according to the interaction between the maintenance agents
and the events which are used for the conditioning in Algorithm 3.
• if the agent does not replace any of the components which are in the conditioning
set, we use a new version of Algorithm 5 where calls to Algorithm 2 in Instructions
2 and 21 are replaced to calls to Algorithm 3 to accommodate the replication of
events. Note that Instructions 1 to 3 of Algorithm 3 have to be executed only once
as the tree and the conditioning distribution do not change with the maintenance
operation.
• if a component in the conditioning set is replaced by the agent at time ti, we have
to restrict ourselves:
· if one of the component of the conditioning set is replaced by the agent, then
all the components in the conditioning set are replaced at the same time.
· if the components which are replaced are the leaves of a subtree rooted in the
trigger of a FDEP gate, then this subtree only contains static gates.
We proceed as follows:
(i) shift the distributions of replaced component by ti,
(ii) evaluate the new conditioning distribution,
(iii) proceed as in the previous case, using the new conditioning distribution.
Note that due to the assumptions, the support of the conditioning distribution
begins at a time instant larger than ti.
3.4 Stochastic monotonicity and rejuvenation
This subsection shows that the reduced-size stochastic bounds of a DFT with re-
juvenation can be also derived using the same methodology. For a DFT without
rejuvenation the relationship between the output distribution of its root and the
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availability at time t, A(t) of the underlying system is given as follows: the avail-
ability of the system at time t corresponds to the probability that the root of the
DFT is FALSE at time t. Recall that the output of a DFT without rejuvenation is
a discrete random variable Q representing the time to failure of the DFT. Then the
availability of the DFT is:
∀t, A(t) = 1−
∑
τ∈HQ|τ≤t
dQ(τ)
It follows from the properties of the ≤st order that if the output distributions
are comparable, then the corresponding availabilities are also comparable [9].
Q ≤st Qu =⇒ A(t) ≤st Au(t)
In order to derive bounds for the systems with maintenance, we assume that the
maintenance dates are the same for the original and the bounding models. The anal-
ysis of the DFTs with rejuvenation can be done through Algorithm 5 by analyzing
a DFT without rejuvenation between consecutive maintenance dates. Therefore by
considering bounding systems in each time interval, a global bound can be com-
puted for DFTs with rejuvenation. Note that it is not necessary to use the same
size parameter for each time interval.
4 Examples
In this section two examples are presented. The ﬁrst one is the so called Hypotheti-
cal Example Computer System (HECS) introduced in [13] for the reliability of fault
tolerant computer based systems. In Figure 4, the block diagram of subsystems of
HECS is given. The DFTs of the subsystems (memory module, processing mod-
ule, bus system, application/interface modules) are presented in Figures 5 and 6.
Note that if any of the four subsystems fails, the HECS will fail. Memory module
consists of ﬁve memory units (M1,M2,M3,M4,M5) which are connected to the
bus system via two memory interface units (MIU1,MIU2). M1 and M2 (resp.
M4,M5) are associated with MIU1 (resp. MIU2), while M3 is connected to both
interface units for redundancy. There must be at least three memory units with
their associated interfaces. In the processing module (S1), the processors A1, A2
and A are identical. A1 and A2 are active and if one of them fails, it is replaced by
the cold spare A. The processing module thus the HECS fail when all processors
fail. There are two identical redundant bus (B1, B2) in the bus module. The three
application/interfaces C1, C2, C3 must be all available.
We assume that the maintenance agents act on the components of module S4
(application/interface module). The mission time is ﬁxed at instant MT = 500 and
it will be assumed that EoT = 501. Let d1, d2 and d3 be the respective failure time
distributions of components C1, C2 and C3. We consider two maintenance agents.
Agent 1 acts on components C1 and C3 by replacing both of them by new ones at
instants t1 = 200 and again at t3 = 400. Agent 2 replaces component C2 at instant
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Bus System
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Failure
Applicaton 
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Failure
Fig. 4. Hypothetical Example Computer System.
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MIU1 MIU2
Fig. 5. Memory module (S2).
Cold Spare 1  
Processing 
System 
Failure
Cold Spare 2  
A1 A2A
Bus System 
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B1 B2
Application
& Interface 
Failure
C1 C2 C3
Fig. 6. Processing module (S1), Bus system (S3) and Application/Interface modules (S4).
t2 = 280. Thus T1 = {t1, t3}, L1 = {C1, C2}, and T2 = {t2} and L2 = {C2}. As
subsystems S1, S2, and S3 are never replaced, their distributions of time before fail-
ure are computed using Algorithm 2 in a preliminary step. However the analysis of
subsystem S4 must be performed for time intervals according to the interventions of
maintenance agents. For a given time interval, the output distribution of the whole
system is then computed by means of the already computed output distributions
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of subsystems S1, S2, S3 and the output distribution of subsystem S4 computed
with input distributions taking into account rejuvenations during this time interval.
This example requires the analysis of four time intervals (p = 4):
[0, t1): all the components start working together, and the output distribution
of subsystem S4 in this interval is calculated by applying Algorithm 2.
[t1, t2): due to the intervention of Agent 1 at t1, components C1 and C3 are
replaced with new ones and their behaviors are described by t1⊗d1 and t1⊗d3. The
output distribution of subsystem S4 is computed by the updated input distributions
for C1, C3 and and the global distribution in this interval is calculated by combining
these distributions with C2. The result is a distribution that covers the interval
[0, t2) but only the part between t1 and t2 is considered.
[t2, t3): due to the intervention of Agent 2 at t2, component C2 is replaced with
a new one whose behavior is described by t2 ⊗ d2. The output distribution of S4
in this interval is calculated by combining it with the distributions of t1 ⊗ d1 and
t1 ⊗ d3 respectively for components C1 and C3. The result is a distribution that
covers the interval [0, t3) but only the part between t2 and t3 will be considered.
[t3,MT ]: due to the intervention of Agent 1 at t3, the components C1 and C3
are replaced with new ones and their behaviors are described by t3⊗ d1 and t3⊗ d3
and the output distribution of S4 in this interval is calculated by combining them
with the distribution of t2 ⊗ d2 for component C2. The result is a distribution that
covers the interval [0,MT ] but only the part between t3 and MT is considered.
Figure 7 depicts the availability of the HECS with time. Note that the avail-
abilities are the same before the ﬁrst intervention.
t
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S4 availability with maintenance
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0.9
HECS availability without maintenance
HECS availability with maintenance
Fig. 7. Availability of subtree S4 (left) and availability of the HECS system with/without maintenance
(right).
4.1 A more complex example
We consider the cardiac assist system (CAS) illustrated in Figure 8 taken from [4].
This system consists of three separate modules (i.e. CPU, motor, and pump), and
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the fault in any of the subsystems yields to the unavailability of the CAS system
(OR gate on the top level). In the CPU unit, the primary (P ) and the backup
(B) CPU units are subject to the common failure coming from the trigger unit
(OR gate). The failure of the crossbar switch (CS) or the system supervision (SS)
triggers the fault making the CPU unit out of work (CPU FDEP). In the motor
section, primary motor unit MA has a cold spare MB which can be activated by
means of the switch MS. Due to the PAND gate, if MS fails before MA, the motor
unit fails when MA fails. On the other case, since the MB has been already turned
on, the failure of MS is not taken into account, and the motor unit fails due to the
failure of the MB. There are two primary pumps PA and PB sharing a cold spare
PS. The pump system and thus CAS system become unavailable when all pumps
become unavailable.
System 
Failure
CPU Unit     
Motors     Pump 1      Pump 2     
PumpMotor
Trigger
CS SS
P B
MS MA MB PA PSPB
Switching Unit
CPU FDEP
Fig. 8. Cardiac Assist System.
We assume that there exist one agent which repairs the CPU subsystem (the
processors, the crossbar and the system supervision). Note that the agent satisﬁes
the assumptions on the replicated events in section 3.3. The agent operates at time
200, 280 and 400. The evolution of the availability with time is depicted in Fig. 9.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the numerical analysis based on stochastic bounds of a DFT
to take into account some maintenance process. By considering discrete random
variables for component failure time distributions, algorithms were given to compute
the overall point availability with respect to time. For safety critical systems it is
important to determine maintenance policies to guarantee the required availability.
The proposed methodology can be generalized to ﬁnd the best maintenance dates to
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Fig. 9. Availability of CPU subsystem (left) and availability of the CAS system with/without maintenance
(right).
reach the maximum availability of the system during a period of time. The method
has been implemented in a software tool which will be available soon.
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